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Abstract—A coordinated trading process is proposed as a
design for an electricity market with significant uncertainty,
perhaps from renewables. In this process, groups of agents
propose to the system operator (SO) a contingent buy and sell
trade that is balanced, i.e. the sum of demand bids and the sum
of supply bids are equal. The SO accepts the proposed trade if
no network constraint is violated or curtails it until no violation
occurs. Each proposed trade is accepted or curtailed as it is
presented. The SO also provides guidance to help future proposed
trades meet network constraints. The SO does not set prices, and
there is no requirement that different trades occur simultaneously
or clear at uniform prices. Indeed, there is no price-setting
mechanism. However, if participants exploit opportunities for
gain, the trading process will lead to an efficient allocation of
energy and to the discovery of locational marginal prices (LMPs).
The great flexibility in the proposed trading process and the low
communication and control burden on the SO may make the
process suitable for coordinating producers and consumers in
the distribution system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power grid increasingly relies on distributed
and variable energy sources. Integration of these new sources
is helped by a market that facilitates matching intermittent
supply and flexible demand [1], [2]. Today the system operator
(SO) achieves resource adequacy, congestion management and
efficiency through reserve requirements, day-ahead (DA) and
real-time (RT) markets, and centralized dispatch of standard
energy commodities, namely specified amount of energy de-
livered at specified nodes at fixed prices [3], [4]. The needs of
important participants cannot be adequately expressed in terms
of these standard commodities, and so the SO allows bilateral
contracts (e.g. Google [5], GM [6] and Amazon [7]), with
contractual arrangements that are not known to the SO. Over
time, the rigidity of the standard commodity was more broadly
felt and fitful accommodations were made by introducing
new commodities, such as demand response, ramping, and
capacity. But given the legacy of the standard market this slow
expansion of the SO’s responsibility cannot unlock the full
contractual flexibility that participants may wish. In particular,
it is challenging to repurpose today’s market design to serve
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the needs of distribution system operators (DSOs) who must
coordinate participants with small distributed generation and
controllable demand side devices, and who would benefit from
differentiated micro-contracts (i.e. contracts whose volumes
are of the order of kWhs). Possible examples of such dif-
ferentiated contracts are (i) contracts for flexible amount of
energy contingent on the realization of uncertain supply or
demand, (ii) contracts to serve deferrable loads that consume
a fixed amount of energy for (say) one hour but which could
be scheduled for any hour of the day [8], [9], (iii) contracts
that favorably price generation sources that are green or more
flexible, and (iv) contracts that encourage local sharing among
prosumers with solar PV and storage devices. Incorporating
these differentiated contracts requires a significant deviation
from an electricity market with a small number of standard
commodities.
In this paper we propose a more flexible alternative to the
current market design, called coordinated multilateral trading.
In this design, participants trade among themselves according
to terms and conditions fashioned to suit their own purposes
like in today’s over the counter markets (OTC), in contrast with
exchanges for trading standardized commodities at transparent
prices. These are contingent trades as the amount of energy
delivered is contingent on events or conditions specified in
the contracts. Since the trades induce power flow, they must be
coordinated to ensure that network constraints are not violated.
The SO accomplishes this coordination task by curtailing
trades if network constraints are violated, and publishing infor-
mation about the network state to guide participants regarding
how subsequent trades can avoid overloading congested lines.
Thus the proposed market design permits flexible contracts
by allowing contingent trades while the SO maintains power
system security. In today’s design the SO computes an efficient
dispatch that respects network line constraints, but in the
proposed design the SO is only concerned with reliability,
and the determination of an efficient dispatch is left to self-
interested participants.
A. Contributions and Organization
Coordinated trading of contingent contracts (described in
Section III) is proposed as a flexible market mechanism in the
context of electric power transmission system operation. We
establish that the trading process is well-defined and during
each step of the process, power system reliability is guaranteed
though the role of the SO is greatly simplified. Furthermore,
we show that the trading process converges to an efficient
dispatch, which meets a benchmark defined using social wel-
fare maximization as in the centralized stochastic economic
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
06
25
3v
4 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
5 A
ug
 20
17
dispatch (Section IV). We also show that this trading process
discovers the optimal locational marginal prices through the
marginal costs of local participants (Section V). Finally, we
prove that the dispatch and prices identified from the trading
process support an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, a notion of
competitive equilibrium under uncertainty (Section VI). The
trading process is illustrated with a simple two-bus example
in Section VII.
B. Related Literature
In studies of the standard electricity market the basic
framework is a one- or two-settlement market (Day Ahead
Market or DAM and Real Time Market or RTM) in a de-
terministic setting [10]–[13]. In this framework, generators
and load serving entities present supply and demand function
bids to the system operator (SO); the SO then calculates
the equilibrium as the generation and load schedule that
maximizes social welfare (producer plus consumer surplus),
subject to the constraint that flows on transmission lines are
limited by their rated capacities. This centralized calculation
has the form of a mathematical programming problem called
the optimum power flow problem. The dual variables at the
optimum solution are called locational or nodal marginal
prices or LMPs. The LMP at a node is the marginal cost of
delivering additional power at that node. In a two-settlement
market there are day ahead and real time LMPs.
In a stochastic context, uncertainty is modeled by a prob-
ability distribution over a set of scenarios. Each scenario has
its specific supply and demand functions, and the SO finds
the schedule that maximizes expected social welfare. This
schedule is contingent, since there is a different schedule
for each scenario [14]–[19]. The complexity of the stochastic
problem grows in three ways with the number of scenarios.
First, each demand and supply bid now is a function of
prices and scenarios, so the number of decision variables and
LMPs will be multiplied by the number of scenarios, thereby
increasing the SO’s communication and computational burden.
Second, there must be agreement among all participants about
the probability distribution over the scenarios, which precludes
heterogeneous beliefs or private information that can affect
beliefs. Third, participants must work out in advance the
bids they will offer for each scenario and price vector. This
complexity has precluded real world implementation of the
optimal stochastic power flow problem. In the absence of con-
tingent (stochastic) bids that permit risk mitigation and reduce
volatility, stochastic perturbations in demand and supply may
lead to the large variations in LMPs that are observed.
Two studies propose decentralized trading processes to
replace the SO’s centralized calculation. In [20], transmission
rights are privately owned; the SO specifies “marginal loading
factors” that is, the amount of capacity on every transmission
line that must be purchased by every proposed bilateral trans-
action. Transmission prices are adjusted iteratively in steps as
follows. At any step nodal price differences adjust to eliminate
arbitrage profits from purchasing energy at one node and
selling at another. Given nodal prices, transmission prices then
are adjusted to increase rents, subject to the competitiveness
condition that the transmission price for a line with excess
capacity must be zero. The iteration converges in the limit to
the welfare maximizing solution, and the nodal prices converge
to the LMPs.
Our proposed design is closer to the decentralized multi-
lateral trading process in [21] and generalizes their trading
process developed for single period deterministic electricity
market into a setting with two periods and with uncertainty
explicitly considered. In the multilateral trading process,
groups of buyers and sellers propose to the SO a balanced
trade, i.e. sum of buy bids equals sum of sell bids. The SO
accepts the trade if (together with previously accepted trades)
no transmission line constraint is violated. Otherwise, the SO
curtails the proposed trade until the violation is eliminated.
No price is announced. The understanding is that the private
terms and conditions of a trade (including monetary payments)
are acceptable to all parties. As in [20] the SO announces
loading vectors to guide participants towards trades that do
not violate line constraints. It is shown that in case generators
are motivated by profit maximization and buyers by utility
maximization, the process will converge to a social welfare
maximum.
Two important distinctions between these decentralized pro-
cesses are worth noting. First, in the language of mathematical
programming, [20] describes a dual method, whereas [21]
gives a primal method. It is possible that at each step the
iteration in [20] is infeasible except in the limit, whereas each
step in [21] is feasible and the process may be stopped at any
point. Second, even though it is decentralized, the process in
[20] is synchronized: trades in each step must occur at the
same time; but in [21] trades are asynchronous.
C. Notation
For a natural number N , [N ] denotes the set {1, . . . , N}. Let
x ∈ RI×J be a matrix, with entries denoted by xi,j , i ∈ [I],
j ∈ [J ]. We use xi ∈ RJ to denote the vector (xi,j)j∈[J] and
xj ∈ RI to denote the vector (xi,j)i∈[I]. For an Euclidean
space Rd, we use 1 ∈ Rd to denote the all-one vector.
II. FORMULATION
A. Network Model
Consider a power network with N buses and L power lines
with capacity constraints. The physics of power network is
described by the AC power flow equations, which is a set
of quadratic equations relating the nodal complex voltages
with nodal complex power injections [22]. In this paper, we
focus on the real power component of the complex power
and adopt a linearized DC approximation to the AC power
flow equations1 [25], as commonly used in current electricity
1The DC approximation does not incorporate voltage constraints which are
important for distribution systems. A different linearization of the AC power
flow, the linearized DistFlow model, should be used for distribution system
applications [23], [24].
markets2 [27]–[29]. Under such a linearization, the region of
feasible nodal power injections has the form
P :=
{
p ∈ RN : −r¯ ≤ Ĥp ≤ r¯, 1>p = 0
}
, (1)
where Ĥ ∈ RL×N is the linear sensitivity matrix relating
the line flows to the nodal injections, and r¯ ∈ RL records
the capacity values of the lines. To simplify the notation, we
denote
H =
[
Ĥ
−Ĥ
]
, and f¯ =
[
r¯
r¯
]
, (2)
so the region of feasible nodal injections becomes
P := {p ∈ RN : Hp ≤ f¯ , 1>p = 0} . (3)
The first inequality in (3) models the line capacity constraints,
while the second equality enforces power balance over the
entire network. We will denote the rows of H , referred to as
loading vectors or shift factors, by h>` ∈ R1×N . Throughout
the paper, we assume that P has a non-empty interior.
B. Uncertainty Model
We consider the operation of the electricity market over two
time periods, the DA market and the RT market.
We explicitly model the RT uncertainty as a finite collection
of S system scenarios, so each scenario is indexed by s ∈ [S]
with probability P(s) > 0. We assume that the set of scenarios
and the probabilities are known to all market participants and
the SO and the realization of a scenario is publicly verifiable
by all of them. We could have the set of feasible injections
P depending on the scenario as well to model transmission
line failures, in which case H and f¯ in (3) will be indexed by
scenario s. We do not do this to simplify the notation.
C. Participant Model
On each bus of the network n ∈ [N ], there resides a collec-
tion of electricity market participants denoted by In, each of
which is either an electricity producer or an electricity load.
We model each market participant by her (or his) RT power
injection plan, denoted by pi = (pi,s)s∈[S], her local feasible
power injection sets, denoted by Pi,s such that pi,s ∈ Pi,s for
all i ∈ In and s ∈ [S], and her von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function over such a plan, denoted by Ui(pi) and taking
the form of
Ui(pi) = E[ui,s(pi,s)] =
∑
s∈[S]
P(s)ui,s(pi,s), (4)
where ui,s(pi,s) is the actual utility given scenario s. Through-
out the paper, we assume a quasi-linear environment, so
that the utility function is linear in the amount of monetary
payment of each market participant, i.e.,
ui,s(pi,s) = mi,s(pi,s) + u˜i,s(pi,s), (5)
2Some of today’s transmission system operators utilize a mixture of AC
and DC model for their operation (e.g. ISO New England uses a DC optimal
power flow with AC feasibility and PJM employs a DC-AC iteration) [26].
Although this paper assumes a linearized power flow model, many of our
results can be extended to the AC power flow model with some work (cf.
Section 7.6 and 7.7 of [21]).
where mi,s(pi,s) is the payment received by the participant in
scenario s and u˜i,s(pi,s) is the utility associated with power
injection pi,s as discussed in detail below. We will assume
that the utility function u˜i,s(·) is concave for each i ∈ I and
s ∈ [S].
For an electricity producer, the power injection is induced by
the producer’s possibly scenario-dependent electricity produc-
tion so that pi ∈ RS+. The feasible power injection sets model
the generation limits, which could be scenario dependent in the
case of renewable generation. Thus, we have Pi,s = [0, p¯i,s],
where p¯i,s is the maximum possible power output in scenario
s. The utility function is as defined in (4) and (5), with
u˜i,s(pi,s) = −ci,s(pi,s), (6)
where ci,s(·) is the cost function of the generation plant.
For an electricity load, the power injection is induced by
the possibly scenario-dependent electricity consumption so
that pi ∈ RS−. Symmetrically with the producer, we have
Pi,s = [−p¯i,s, 0], where p¯i,s is the maximum possible power
demand in scenario s. The utility function is taken to be
u˜i,s(pi,s) = bi,s(pi,s), (7)
where bi,s(·) characterizes the benefit of using power by the
particular load. For large loads (e.g. resellers), the benefit
corresponds to the profit made from the given power con-
sumption; for small loads such as individual consumers, the
benefit function reflects the monetary value of consuming
electricity and is a widely used device for modeling how power
consumption varies with prices [30]–[32]. Allowing the benefit
function to be scenario dependent is useful for modeling e.g.
demand response resources whose availability is not known a
priori.
We partition the set In as In = IDAn ∪ IRTn such that
IDAn ∩ IRTn = ∅ and denote IDA = ∪n∈[N ]IDAn and IRT =
∪n∈[N ]IRTn , where IDAn contains producers/loads connected
to bus n whose power injection has to be fixed in DA and
cannot adapt to RT scenarios and IRTn are those that can
adapt to RT scenarios. We refer to participants in IDA as DA
participants and those in IRT as RT participants. Technically,
the power injection plan of DA participants must satisfy the
non-anticipation constraint
pi,s = pi,s˜, for all s, s˜ ∈ [S]. (8)
To simplify the notation, let
P¯i = {pi ∈ RS : pi,s ∈ Pi,s, s ∈ [S]}, (9)
and
Pi =
{
P¯i ∩ {pi ∈ RS : pi,s = pi,s˜, s, s˜ ∈ [S]}, i ∈ IDA,
P¯i, i ∈ IRT.
(10)
Examples of DA participants include power plants that cannot
ramp up or down following the RT uncertainty, such as coal-
based generation plants, and loads that contract a fixed amount
of consumption in each hour in DA. RT participants can
either be variable generation sources or demand modeling
e.g. renewable generation or random power consumption,
or controllable generation or demand that can adapt to RT
scenarios, such as fast-ramping gas generation or demand
response resources.
D. Efficiency Benchmark
A commonly used criteria for economic efficiency is Pareto
optimality. In a quasi-linear environment, it is equivalent to the
following stochastic social welfare maximization problem
maximize U(p) :=
∑
i∈I
Ui(pi) (11a)
subject to pi ∈ Pi, i ∈ I, (11b)
xn,s =
∑
i∈In
pi,s, n ∈ [N ], s ∈ [S], (11c)
xs ∈ P, s ∈ [S]. (11d)
Notice that when the system does not take money from outside
sources, we must have ex post budget adequacy:∑
i∈I
mi,s(pi,s) ≤ 0. (12)
If ex post budget balance holds, i.e.,
∑
i∈Imi,s(pi,s) = 0,
then the social welfare maximization program (11) is equiv-
alent to the stochastic economic dispatch problem with the
objective of (11) replaced by∑
i∈I
Ui(pi) =
∑
i∈I
E [u˜i,s(pi,s)], (13)
where the summation is the net sum of ex ante generation costs
and load benefits as discussed in the previous subsection.
III. TRADING PROCESS
The simplest market mechanism is one based on meet-
ing and trading among self-interested agents. The electricity
market is different in that centralized coordination has been
commonly considered essential to ensure power system relia-
bility constraints (3). Indeed, completely decentralized trading
without coordination could lead to line flows that violate
their capacity limits and compromise the reliability of the
system. As such, the standard power system market designs
rely on a centralized clearing house (or market maker), referred
to as system operator (SO), to solve an economic dispatch
optimization in order to determine the generator schedules and
electricity prices. When uncertainty from renewable generation
is considered, the resulting stochastic economic dispatch prob-
lem is computationally more complex and leads to increased
communication requirement between the SO and market par-
ticipants.
Wu and Varaiya [21] propose a remarkably simple fix to
make the free-market style meet-and-trade procedure respect
the power system reliability constraints (3). The idea is to
inject minimal amount of coordination, implemented by the
SO, into the free trades so that the reliability (or feasibility)
is guaranteed in every step of the trading process as shown
in Figure 1. They also establish that the trading process
achieves economic efficiency in the limit. We will generalize
their coordinated trading framework developed for single
period deterministic electricity market into a setting with two
periods and with uncertainty explicitly considered. Although
we consider only a two-period market (consisting of a forward
market, i.e. DA, and a delivery period, i.e. RT) below, the
analysis readily extends to settings with multiple delivery
periods.
Participants propose 
an admissible trade
SO checks 
feasibility
SO accepts the trade
SO accepts the 
curtailed trade
SO updates the system state and announces 
trading requirements
Repeat until convergence
Yes
No
Fig. 1. Conceptual diagram for the trading process.
In this paper, we consider a setting where all market partic-
ipants trade exclusively in DA. This means that during the DA
market, each DA participant i ∈ IDA trades and determines
her power injection while each RT participant i ∈ IRT trades
and determines her contingent power injection plan. Since
under the current setting with a complete DA forward market,
there is no need for RT re-trading, i.e., additional RT trading
can not improve social welfare, we assume that there is no
trading in real time.
We start with definitions for the trading process. Given the
abstract nature of some of the definitions, examples demon-
strating them are provided in Section VII and linked here in
footnotes.
The premise of our trading system is that self-interested
market participants will meet and propose trades for their own
benefits, very much like how today’s bilateral power purchase
contracts are formed. Thus the fundamental building block of
such a system is the notion of trade:
Definition 1 (Contingent trade): A contingent multilateral
trade (referred to as trade in the sequel)3 among a group Ik ⊂
I of participants, is a collection of power injection plans
pk = (pki,s)i∈Ik, s∈[S], (14)
that are feasible with respect to participants’ local constraints,
i.e. pi ∈ Pi, and ex post balanced so that∑
i∈Ik
pki,s = 0, s ∈ [S]. (15)
For convenience, we also define pki,s = 0 for i 6∈ Ik, so that
given pk we can infer Ik via
Ik = {i ∈ I : there exists a s ∈ [S] s.t. pki,s 6= 0}. (16)
3See Table I in Section VII for an example.
This definition is convenient from the point of view of the
SO. In practice, a trade is a transaction that exchanges power
with money. We will touch upon the money side of the trading
process in Section V and VI. The power balance condition is
natural: the amounts of power supplied and consumed must
be equal in each scenario. This definition also stresses that
the commodity for sale is scenario-contingent power. That is,
1 MWh in different scenarios of RT are treated as different
commodities.
Some further remarks are in order for Definition 1.
Remark 1 (Need for multilateral trades): As indicated in
Definition 1, a trade may involve more than two market
participants. Although multilateral trades are less common in
practice compared with bilateral trades, for our purpose, it is
necessary to consider multilateral trades so that the trading
process is guaranteed to converge to an efficient dispatch.
See [21] for an example in which bilateral trading fails to
converge to the optimal dispatch due to loop externality [33].
When the network does not have cycles, it is possible to
show that bilateral trades suffice under certain conditions. See
Appendix D.
Remark 2 (SO’s sufficient statistics): While market partici-
pants must keep track of their own power injection plans, from
the power system’s perspective, contingent (network) nodal
injection vectors, calculated from
qkn,s =
∑
i∈In
pki,s, n ∈ [N ], s ∈ [S], (17)
carry all the necessary information for checking the reliability
constraints in (3). In particular, a trade among participants at
the same node of network makes zero contribution to the actual
nodal injection and thus is not of concern to the SO.
Trades motivated by participants interests do not take into
account power system reliability constraints. So it is necessary
to have the SO verify that trades meet the power system
constraints, and in case of violation to curtail trades so that
compliance is achieved. Throughout the paper, we consider a
simple curtailment scheme:
Definition 2 (Uniform curtailment): A trade pk is said to
be curtailed if only a portion of the proposed power injection,
γkpk, is accepted by the SO, where γk ∈ [0, 1) is the
curtailment factor and
(γkpk)i,s = γ
kpki,s, i ∈ Ik, s ∈ [S]. (18)
For notational convenience, we also define γk = 1 when a
trade is accepted without curtailment.4
Remark 3 (Scenario-dependent curtailment): The uniform
curtailment scheme is the simplest curtailment scheme that
ensures local feasibility of curtailed trades given that the initial
trades satisfy local constraints. That is, given a trade pk such
that pki ∈ Pi, i ∈ I, the curtailed trade always satisfies
γkpki ∈ Pi, i ∈ I. It is possible to make the curtailment
scenario-dependent, i.e., for each scenario s ∈ [S], we can
pick a different curtailment factor γks ∈ [0, 1]. This curtailment
4Table II in Section VII provides an example of a curtailed trade.
scheme no longer has the local feasibility property if DA
participants are involved in the initial trade. In particular,
the curtailed trade will not satisfy non-anticipative constraints
of DA participants if the curtailment factors for different
scenarios are taken to be different values. A hybrid of the
uniform curtailment and scenario-dependent curtailment is to
use the former when a trade involves DA participants and to
use the latter when it does not. One can verify that all our
results hold for this curtailment scheme as well.
During the DA market time window, a sequence of trades will
come up for SO’s approval. Thus the notion of power system
reliability and the calculation of curtailment depend on trades
that are already accepted into the system. We define a notion
of system trading state as follows:
Definition 3 (Trading state): Given a sequence of trades pκ
and their curtailment factor γκ, κ = 0, . . . , k − 1, the global
trading state is the accumulated participants’ contingent power
injection
yki,s =
k−1∑
κ=0
γκpκi,s, i ∈ I, s ∈ [S], (19)
and the network state for the SO is the accumulated network
power injection
xkn,s =
k−1∑
κ=0
γκqκn,s =
k−1∑
κ=0
∑
i∈In
γκpκi,s, n ∈ [N ], s ∈ [S].
(20)
The network and trading states relate as
xkn,s =
∑
i∈In
yki,s. (21)
Given the current system state xk, a characterization for a
trade pk to be feasible for network constraints (3) is that its
corresponding network injection vector qk as defined in (17)
satisfies
xks + q
k
s ∈ P, s ∈ [S]. (22)
Define the scenario-contingent feasible set of network injec-
tion as
Qs(xs) = P − xs = {qs ∈ RN : xs + qs ∈ P}, s ∈ [S],
(23)
and Q(x) = Qs(x1)× . . .×QS(xS). Then (22) is equivalent
to qk ∈ Q(xk).
A potential issue of the trading process, in view of Defini-
tion 2, is that γk may have to be 0 to bring many trades back to
feasible. Indeed, if the market participants are proposing trades
without any information regarding the current network state
xk, then it is likely that many trades overburdening lines which
are already congested at xk will be proposed. To forestall
such a possibility, the SO requires participants to only submit
trades that are in the feasible direction of the network given
the current state.
Definition 4 (Feasible direction trade): Given a network
state xk, let Ls(xks) be the set of active (binding) line
constraints in scenario s, that is,
Ls(xks) = {` ∈ [L] : h>` xks = f¯`}, s ∈ [S]. (24)
Then a trade pk is a feasible-direction (FD) trade at xk if its
corresponding network injection qk as defined in (17) satisfies
h>` q
k
s ≤ 0, ` ∈ Ls(xks), s ∈ [S]. (25)
If market participants are constrained to propose only FD
trades, then it is guaranteed that γk > 0 so that every
trade updates the network state. At this moment, it is unclear
whether such update is favorable in any sense. Formalizing the
notion of “self-interested” participants, we have the following
definition.
Definition 5 (Worthwhile trade): We call a trade pk an
-worthy trade at trading state yk if it leads to welfare
improvement no smaller than , i.e.,∑
i∈Ik
Ui(y
k
i + p
k
i )− Ui(yki ) ≥ , (26)
and an -unworthy trade if (26) does not hold. A profitable
trade is an -worthy trade with  = 0.
Notice that if an -worthy trade is proposed by some
participants and accepted by the SO, then it improves the
social welfare by at least  as the power injection plans of
participants not involved in the trade are not changed.
We can now formalize the coordinated trading process.
Step 1. Initialization. The SO initializes the system state xk
corresponding to some initial feasible trade pk, k = 0.
Step 2. Announcement. The SO checks the congestion state
of the system at xk, identifies Ls(xks) for s ∈ [S] and
announces the network loading vectors h`, ` ∈ Ls(xks)
for each s ∈ [S].
Step 3. Trading. If a profitable trade5 in the feasible direction
pk is identified, participants arrange it. If no profitable
trade is found, go to Step 6.
Step 4. Curtailment. If pk is not feasible, i.e., the correspond-
ing network injection qk is such that qk 6∈ Q(xk), the
SO curtails the trade with
γk = max
{
γ : γqk ∈ Q(xk)} ∈ (0, 1). (27)
If pk is feasible, set γk = 1.
Step 5. Update. The SO updates the network state as xk+1 ←
xk + γkqk, k ← k + 1. Go to Step 2.
Step 6. Termination.
It is evident from the description of the trading process
that the SO only has the following responsibilities. (i) SO
checks whether the trade newly submitted by participants is
feasible with respect to network constraints. If not, it curtails
the trade so that the resulting trade is feasible. (ii) In case
there are congested lines, the SO computes and broadcasts the
loading vectors to the participants. Note that in our framework,
the SO does not carry out any optimization. Instead, market
participants seek to optimize their own profit during the trading
process.
Remark 4 (Feasibility): An important feature of the trading
process is that the proposed system state xk for any k is
5We refer to the resulting trading process as an -trading process when the
requirement of profitable trade is replaced by -worthy trade.
feasible with respect to the power network constraints. Thus
even if the trading process is stopped at any stage before
termination, the trades still result in a safe power flow solution.
Remark 5 (Pay-as-bid settlement): The trading process al-
lows a pay-as-bid payment settlement approach. Immediately
after submitting the trade, the market participants are informed
whether their trades will be scheduled (or partially scheduled
if curtailed); this information can then be used to calculate
and settle the payment among these participants. Comparing
to the locational pricing used in the standard market, such a
payment settlement process could limit the price risk faced by
market participants which are expected to increase when the
system integrates more renewables. This is also part of the
reason why bilateral long-term contracts are widely used by
large utility companies and power producers.
IV. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Similar to arguments in [21], one can verify that trading
process described in the previous subsection is well-defined,
and whenever a -worthy trade is identified ( > 0), the
social welfare is strictly increased (even if the trade is to be
curtailed). Thus when the trading process terminates, that is,
when there exists no additional profitable trade that is not yet
arranged, one may expect that the resulting power injection
plan matches the economic efficiency benchmark defined by
stochastic optimization problem (11).
Theorem 1 (Efficiency): Suppose the following assumptions
are in force:
(i) for any fixed  > 0, any -unworthy trade in the feasible
direction will not be arranged and any -worthy trade
will eventually be identified and arranged, and
(ii) once a worthy profitable trade is identified, the market
participants involved are willing to carry it out.
Then the -trading process is well-defined and the accumulated
global trading state yk converges in the sense that
U? − lim
k→∞
U(yk) ≤ , (28)
where U? is the optimal value of (11).
When  is sufficiently small, Theorem 1 states that the
trading process will converge to a dispatch that is practically
optimal for any desired accuracy. The key message of Theo-
rem 1 is that the extremely simple feedback procedure of the
SO based on curtailment and loading vector announcement
suffices in providing coordination for the trades so that effi-
ciency is achieved while network reliability is guaranteed in
every iteration of the trading process.
Remark 6 (Trade formation): Like in [21], we purposely
leave the details of trading group formation open. Theorem 1
is powerful in that it is agnostic to the actual underlying mech-
anism dictating which subset of participants meet and propose
trade k. For instance, a conceptually simple mechanism is that
in every iteration k, a subset of I is picked at random such
that there is a positive probability for picking every subset6.
6We can e.g. first sample a random group size Ik from [|I|] and then
randomly sample a group from I of size Ik .
If it is possible for this group of participants to identify a
profitable trade in the feasible direction, they will propose it,
as in Step 3 of the trading process. If not, we can simply
continue this process by generating another random group
of participants. Since there is a finite number of subsets of
I, Theorem 1 guarantees that this process converges to an
efficient dispatch with probability one. In practice, trading
group formation processes depend on a lot of factors that
we do not model in this paper. As a result, it could be the
case that each participant i ∈ I may only have access to a
small subset of other participants in the market. An important
future research direction is to design information platforms
that facilitate trade discovery and reduce search cost.
Remark 7 (Profit allocation): Similarly, we do not specify
how profit is allocated among the participants if a profitable
trade is proposed and accepted by the SO. One can verify
(or cf. [21]) that for every profitable trade, there is a profit
allocation that makes all involving participants better off.
Remark 8 (Merchandising surplus): In the standard market,
the total payment collected from loads is larger than that
paid to generators when there are line congestions. This
merchandising surplus [34] is paid to transmission owners. In
our setting, as the SO does not collect money from participants
and all trades are budget balanced, separate payment streams
might be needed to cover the costs of the transmission owners.
Possible ways include charging a fee for using the transmission
or requiring participants to acquire transmission rights for
making trades across the network.
Remark 9 (Algorithmic interpretation): The trading process
may be thought of as a projected line search algorithm for
solving (11), whose iteration k performs update
yk+1 = yk + γkpk, (29)
where pk is the search direction and γk is the step length
introduced to project the step into the feasible region. The al-
gorithm is distributed, in that the search direction is identified
based on information (and objective functions) of a subset of
participants. The algorithm is special as its search direction
pk is identified from a profitable trade, which is an economic
construct, rather than based on gradient or Hessian of the
objective function.
Remark 10 (Subjective probability): In general, different
market participants may have their own subjective assessment
of the probabilities of the scenarios. Denote the subjective
probabilities of participant i ∈ I by Pi(s), s ∈ [S]. Then
yk converges to an optimal solution of (11) with the ex ante
utility function replaced by
Ui(pi) = Ei[ui,s(pi,s)] =
∑
s∈[S]
Pi(s)ui,s(pi,s). (30)
In this case, the resulting dispatch is Pareto optimal but may
not maximize the ex ante social welfare as the latter notion is
defined upon the unknown true probability distribution of the
uncertainty.
Remark 11 (Distribution system operator): The trading pro-
cess also offers a way to design a lightweight or minimal distri-
bution system operator (minDSO) for coordinating distributed
generation (DG), flexible loads and other distribution level
resources. With minDSO, the DG owners and demand side
flexibility providers do not need to report cost and benefit data
to the minDSO; so long as they can determine profitable trades
among themselves, social welfare will improve. To adapt our
formulation to the distribution system setting, the linearized
DistFlow model [23], [24] provides an accurate model of the
real power flow on the distribution network. Line capacity and
transformer limits can be modeled similarly as transmission
line limits. The tree network topology offers potential sim-
plification to the trading process (see Appendix D). Voltage
constraints can be modeled as additional linear constraints
[35]. Distribution topology switching can be accommodated
by updating the network constraint set P according to the
current switch states.
V. PRICE DISCOVERY
In standard markets, the SO solves an economic dispatch
problem that determines both the dispatch and the locational
marginal prices of power at all buses. When uncertainty is con-
sidered, the computationally demanding stochastic economic
dispatch must be solved by the SO.
The trading process, on the contrary, does not require the SO
to solve any optimization problem. Theorem 1 suggests that
an efficient dispatch is achieved in the limit; here we show
that the optimal locational marginal prices also emerge when
the trading process converges7. The idea is simple. Suppose
that in the last few minutes of the DA trading window, when
the trading process has already converged, a new load comes
into the system and demands a  → 0 unit of power at bus
n for scenario s. Producers who can still generate additional
power could each quote a price based on their marginal cost
evaluated at the current trading state. We thus discover the
locational marginal price at bus n for scenario s by finding
the minimum price announced by those generators that can
indeed send power to bus n given the congestion state in the
scenario.
To formalize this idea, denote the optimal dual variable
associated with constraint (11c) by λ?n,s, n ∈ [N ], s ∈ [S].
Furthermore, as constraint (11b) for RT participants is a box
constraint, denote the optimal dual variables associated with
the lower and upper bounds by η?
i,s
and η?i,s, respectively.
Notice that the trading process has a balanced budget by
construction, as the system operator is not involved in any
financial aspect of the system. Therefore, problem (11) is
equivalent to the stochastic economic dispatch problem.
Lemma 1 (Price discovery): For each bus n ∈ [N ] and s ∈
[S], if there exists a participant i ∈ IRTn whose utility function
is differentiable and whose optimal contingent power injection
7An alternative treatment, involving setting up trade-based prices and
characterizing the convergence of the price process, is also possible (cf. [20],
[36]). However, this requires a detailed specification of payments associated
with each trade which we avoid in this paper.
p?i,s is in the interior of her local feasible set, i.e., p
?
i,s ∈ P˚i,s,
then we have8
λ?n,s = −P(s)
∂u˜i,s(p
?
i,s)
∂pi,s
. (31)
In general, suppose the utility function of some participant
i ∈ IRTn is differentiable, then
λ?n,s = −P(s)
∂u˜i,s(p
?
i,s)
∂pi,s
+ (η?i,s − η?i,s). (32)
While the price calculation based on (31) is intuitive and
only requires local information, that based on (32) may require
solving the dual program of (11) to identify the values of the
optimal dual variables η?i,s and η
?
i,s
. Fortunately, solving for
the dual program is greatly simplified when the optimal primal
solution p? is known (cf. [37]).
VI. ARROW-DEBREU EQUILIBRIUM
Section IV established that the trading process converges
to a stationary contingent power injection plan p?. Section V
then showed that there is a well-defined notion of price λ?
that emerges alongside with the stationary injection plan. Here
we connect the pair (p?, λ?) to the suitable economic concept
of general equilibrium under uncertainty. Taken together, this
will formally establish that the contingent trading process
converges to a (contingent plan, price) equilibrium, which
respects the power system reliability constraints and achieves
economic efficiency.
To start, we need to define an electricity market economy,
similar to that done in [18] (also see [38]). The commodities of
the economy is contingent power at each node n ∈ [N ] and in
each scenario s ∈ [S]. Buying (selling) a unit contingent power
(n, s) in DA leads to the right to consume (responsibility to
generate) a unit of power at node n if scenario s occurs in RT.
The market participants are those in I as defined in Sec-
tion II-C and a traditional system operator9 who may convert
power at one node into that at another node using the network.
For each participant i ∈ I, given prices for contingent
power λ, the following optimization is solved to determine
the participant’s contingent power injection plan
maximize
∑
s∈[S]
λn,spi,s + P(s)u˜i,s(pi,s) (33a)
subject to pi ∈ Pi, (33b)
where λn,s is the price at node n faced by i ∈ In. Here the
objective function is the same as Ui(pi) as defined in (4) with
linear payment scheme
mi,s(pi,s) = λ˜n,spi,s, (34)
where λ˜n,s = λn,s/P(s). Notice that the first term in the
summation in (33a) is the monetary payment that clears in
DA; the second term is the expected utility derived from the
power injection in RT.
8The sign convention is that pi,s > 0 represents power injection (supply)
into the network. Thus if u˜i,s is a utility function that in the usual sense is
increasing with demand, λ?n,s as computed below will be nonnegative.
9This notion of SO is consistent with that in the literature and different
from the SO described in Section III.
The SO is modeled as a firm that uses technology (i.e. power
network) to convert one type of commodity (i.e. contingent
power on one node) to other types of commodities (i.e.
contingent power on other nodes), in order to maximize its
profit. Formally, the SO solves the following optimization to
determine the contingent network power injection x given
prices for contingent power λ:
maximize
∑
s∈[S]
∑
n∈[N ]
−λn,sxn,s (35a)
subject to xs ∈ P, s ∈ [S], (35b)
where the entire profit of SO in (35a) is cleared in DA.
The suitable notion of competitive equilibrium of such a
market for contingent claims is that of Arrow-Debreu, which
generalizes the Walrasian concept of general equilibrium to
settings with uncertainty [39]. Here we state the definition of
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for the electricity market economy:
Definition 6 (Arrow-Debreu equilibrium): A collection of
contingent power injection plans (p?, x?), with p? ∈ R|I|×S
and x? ∈ RN×S and a system of prices for contingent power
λ? ∈ RN×S constitute an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium if:
(i) For every i ∈ I, p?i solves (33) given prices λ?.
(ii) For the SO, x? solves (35) given prices λ?.
(iii) The market for each contingent power commodity clears:
x?n,s =
∑
i∈In
p?i,s, n ∈ [N ], s ∈ [S]. (36)
By the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics and
in a quasi-linear environment, we expect that a dispatch-price
tuple (p?, x?, λ?) at an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium achieves
economic efficiency defined by (11) (cf. [39], [40]). Our
previous result suggests that the dispatch at the limit of the
trading process together with the emerged prices matches
the solution of (11). Our next result establishes that the
dispatch-price tuple obtained from the trading process indeed
constitutes an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
Lemma 2: Suppose that an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists
and that the utility functions are differentiable. Then the
contingent power injection plan p? obtained from the trading
process, the corresponding network injection plan x? calcu-
lated from (11c), and the prices computed from (31) or (32)
constitute an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
Remark 12 (Taˆtonnement process): In light of Lemma 2,
the trading process can be thought of as a way to drive
an out-of-equilibrium market into its equilibrium. Such pro-
cesses, characterizing the dynamic laws of out-of-equilibrium
movement of the market state, is in general referred to as a
taˆtonnement process; see [41].
VII. EXAMPLES
We provide an illustrative example for the trading process
in this section.
Consider a two bus network depicted in Figure 2. There are
3 generators and 1 load connected to the system. We list the
relevant data for the participants as follows
• G1 is a coal power plant that can generate up to 200
MW at a constant marginal cost 50 $/MW. It can only
be scheduled in the DA stage due to its lead time.
• G2 is a wind farm that generates 100 MW in the first
scenario (windy scenario) and 50 MW in the second
scenario (breezy scenario) at no operational cost. Suppose
there are only these two scenarios for the system and one
of them is realized at the delivery time. The underlying
probabilities for these two scenarios are 0.6 and 0.4,
respectively.
• G3 is a gas power plant that can ramp up rapidly at real
time with 100 MW capacity and constant marginal cost
of 80 $/MW.
• Load represents an inelastic power consumption of 150
MW.
G1
Load
Limit = 120
G2
G3
p1
p2
p3
p4
Fig. 2. Network diagram for the two-bus example.
For the purpose of illustrating the interaction between
market participants and the PSO, in this example we assume
that in each iteration all four participants meet and propose a
trade with no knowledge of the network constraint. In DA,
as an example, the participants could solve the following
optimization problem to identify the cost minimization trade
minimize 50p1 +E [80p3,s] = 50p1 + 48p3,1 + 32p3,2
subject to p1 + p2,s + p3,s + p4 = 0, s = 1, 2,
p4 = −150,
0 ≤ p1 ≤ 200,
0 ≤ p3,s ≤ 100, s = 1, 2,
0 ≤ p2,1 ≤ 100, 0 ≤ p2,2 ≤ 50,
where the optimization variables are the day-ahead scheduled
coal power generation p1, the real-time gas power generation
p3,s corresponding to the two scenarios, and wind power
generation corresponding to the two scenarios p2,s (which
is controllable up to curtailment). Upon solving this linear
program, the participants propose its solution as their initial
trade to the SO, which is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
POWER INJECTION (UNIT: MW) OF THE INITIAL TRADE PROPOSED BY
THE PARTICPANTS.
Scenario G1 G2 G3 Load
Windy 50 100 0 -150
Breezy 50 50 50 -150
This trade is not feasible with respect to the line limit in the
windy scenario. As such, the SO curtails the trade to the one
shown in Table II with γ = 0.8. The SO also announces the
loading vector such that the constraints (25) can be expressed
as ∆p1 + ∆p2,s − ∆p3,s − ∆p4 ≤ 0, where ∆p’s are the
corresponding changes in the power injections, and s = 1, 2
as the line limit constraint is binding for both scenarios. The
participants then solve the following program to identify a
profitable trade in the feasible direction:
TABLE II
POWER INJECTION (UNIT: MW) OF THE CURTAILED TRADE.
Scenario G1 G2 G3 Load
Windy 40 80 0 -120
Breezy 40 40 40 -120
minimize 50(p˜1+∆p1)+48(p˜3,1+∆p3,1)+32(p˜3,2+∆p3,2)
subject to ∆p1 + ∆p2,s + ∆p3,s + ∆p4 = 0, s = 1, 2,
∆p1 + ∆p2,s −∆p3,s −∆p4 ≤ 0, s = 1, 2,
p˜4 + ∆p4 = −150,
0 ≤ p˜1 + ∆p1 ≤ 200,
0 ≤ p˜3,s + ∆p3,s ≤ 100, s = 1, 2,
0 ≤ p˜2,1+∆p2,1 ≤ 100, 0 ≤ p˜2,2+∆p2,2 ≤ 50,
where the p˜’s are the curtailed trade given in Table II. The
resulting accumulated trade γp+∆p is shown in Table III. The
trading process would terminate now as there is no profitable
feasible direction trade can be further identified. One can
easily verify that the accumulated trade coincides with the
solution to (11) for this example, and therefore the trading
process indeed achieves efficiency.
TABLE III
POWER INJECTION (UNIT: MW) OF THE ACCUMULATED TRADE γp+ ∆p.
Scenario G1 G2 G3 Load
Windy 20 100 30 -150
Breezy 20 50 80 -150
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Contingent coordinated trading is proposed as a market
framework for power system resource allocation under un-
certainty. Within the framework, the economic efficiency is
achieved via coordinated trades proposed by any groups of
market participants for their own benefit. The trading process
also discovers the optimal contingent locational marginal
prices, and supports an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the
market. Allowing the trades to be contingent on properly
defined system scenarios greatly enhances the flexibility of the
trades and could result in an improvement of social welfare
compared to standard deterministic dispatch based market
clearing. The role of the SO is minimal in our framework as
the SO only monitors the trades, curtails them if necessary, and
does not collect any cost data or directly intervene in economic
decisions. As such, all suppliers and consumers have open
access to the power network, which promotes competition and
expedites the processes of new generation and consumer-side
technology adoption.
We envision that the proposed framework could help address
many challenges in designing new DSOs for distribution
systems with deep distributed energy resource penetration.
Given the novelty of the proposed framework, it is natural that
this paper leaves a variety of fundamental questions open.
• Uncertainty model. In practice, it is unlikely that we can
obtain an exact characterization of all possible scenarios
for the entire system in DA. Thus extending our ideal
uncertainty model by incorporating information updates
could make the trading framework more realistic. Under
such settings, it may become advantageous to allow RT
re-trading as the realized RT scenario may not be exactly
one of the pre-scribed scenarios in DA. Additionally, even
if it is possible to characterize the set of all possible
scenarios, the total number of scenarios may be very
large due to the fact that many scenarios are local (see
Appendix E for a model where all scenarios are local).
Thus in practice, suitable factorization (decomposing the
scenario tree into system wide scenarios and local sce-
narios) or scenario reduction is necessary for successful
market design based on the proposed trading framework.
• Trade implementation. As all trades happen before real
time, in real time, the participants need to supply and
consume according to the scheduled trades. To ensure this
indeed happens, advance metering infrastructure (AMI)
systems and suitable financial incentive (or penalty)
scheme have to be in place. Thus an open question is
how to design such financial schemes that encourage
consistent participant behaviors while limits potential
gaming activities.
• Trade formation. For distribution system applications, re-
quiring participants to meet and trade seems overwhelm-
ing. A more likely setting is to rely on one or many third-
party marketplaces to identify profitable trades on behalf
of (subsets of) the participants. Our analysis also applies
to such settings thanks to our general assumption on the
trade formation process. In this context, our results are
better understood as a form of separation principle, which
ensures lossless separation of network reliability from
market efficiency considerations with our trading frame-
work. Under such separation, third party marketplaces
can fill the role of trade identification and formation
without any explicit knowledge of the power network, as
long as it follows the rules set by the SO. Designing and
implementing such third-party marketplaces to unlock
potentials from distributed energy resources and flexible
loads thus is an important future direction to explore.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We prove Theorem 1 by first establishing a more general
version of the result for optimization of the form
maximize U(p) (37a)
subject to Ep = 0, (37b)
Dp ≤ d, (37c)
pi ∈ Pi, i ∈ [m], (37d)
and then show that Theorem 1 is a special case. Here the
decision variables are pi ∈ Rn, i ∈ [m] so that p ∈ Rmn,
constraint matrices E ∈ Rr1×mn and D ∈ Rr2×mn are such
that {p : Ep = 0, Dp ≤ d} is a closed compact subset of Rmn,
local feasible sets Pi, i ∈ [m] are closed, compact and convex
subsets of Rn, where n,m, r1 and r2 are positive integers.
For each  > 0, we consider an iterative algorithm for
solving (37) of the following form: given y0 ∈ Rmn feasible
for (37), the iterations are generated by a point-to-set mapping
A : Rmn 7→ 2Rmn . That is,
yk+1 ∈ A(yk), k ∈ Z+. (38)
We consider a specific algorithmic mapping that is a com-
position of two mappings: A = CF. Here the point-to-set
mapping F : Rmn 7→ Rmn × 2Rmn is defined such that
(y′, p) ∈ F(y) if y′ = y and
p ∈ G(y) =
 p ∈ R
mn :
Ik ⊂ [m], pi = 0, i 6∈ Ik,
yi + pi ∈ Pi, i ∈ Ik,
Ep = 0, D(y)p ≤ 0,
U(y + p)− U(y) ≥ 
 ,
(39)
where D(y) is the matrix containing rows of D corresponding
to binding constraints at y. The point-to-point mapping C :
Rmn × Rmn → Rmn is defined such that C(y, p) = y + γp
where
γ = max{γ ∈ (0, 1] : D(y + γp) ≤ d}. (40)
The convergence theorem that we wish to establish is
formally stated as follows.
Lemma 3: Suppose U is concave and problem (37) has a
solution and its feasible set has a nonempty interior. Denote
the optimal value of (37) by U?. Then for any given feasible
y0, any process {yk}k∈Z+ generated by algorithmic mapping
A in the sense of (38) has objective values {U(yk)}k∈Z+
such that
U? − lim
k→∞
U(yk) ≤ . (41)
Notice that in (38), any point in the set A(yk) can be picked
as yk+1, and thus Lemma 3 is asserting a form of convergence
for a family of an infinite numbers of processes {yk}k∈Z+ . A
classical result concerning with this type of convergence is
Zangwill’s global convergence theorem [42] (also see [43]):
Theorem 2: Let A be an algorithm on set X , and suppose
that starting from x0 the sequence {xk}k∈Z+ is generated
satisfying xk+1 ∈ A(xk). Let a solution set X ? ⊂ X be given,
and suppose
1) all points xk are contained in a compact set S ⊂ X ,
2) there is a continuous function U on X such that (i) if
x 6∈ X ?, then U(y) > U(x) for all y ∈ A(x), and (ii) if
x ∈ X ?, then U(y) ≥ U(x) for all y ∈ A(x),
3) the mapping A is closed at points outside of X ?.
Then the limit of any convergent subsequence of {xk}k∈Z+ is
in X ?.
The proof of Lemma 3 amounts to checking conditions in
the theorem above for solution set P? which are feasible points
p for (37) such that U? − U(p) ≤ .
Proof of Lemma 3: The objective function U is concave,
hence continuous. The feasible set of (37) is an intersection of
closed, compact, and convex sets and is also closed, compact
and convex. It remains to show that the sequence {yk}k∈Z+
is feasible and ascent, and the mapping A is closed.
(a) The sequence {yk}k∈Z+ is feasible for constraints of (37).
The initial point y0 is feasible by assumption. Suppose that
yk is feasible. As pk ∈ G(yk), we have Epk = 0 and so
E(yk + γpk) = 0 for any γ. Therefore Eyk+1 = 0. We also
have Dyk+1 ≤ d by the definition of γ in (40). (Notice that
a nonzero γ exists as the feasible set of (37) has nonempty
interior.) Finally, yk+1i = y
k
i + γp
k
i ∈ Pi since yki ∈ Pi,
yki + p
k
i ∈ Pi and Pi is convex. Thus yk is feasible for all k
by induciton.
(b) The sequence {U(yk)}k∈Z+ is nondecreasing for yk 6∈ P? .
By the last condition in the definition of set G, we have
U(yk+pk)−U(yk) ≥  > 0. As γ ∈ (0, 1] and U is concave,
we have U(yk + γpk)− U(yk) > 0.
(c) The mapping A is closed.
As the feasible set is closed, it suffices to prove that
the graph of A is closed. That is, for any sequence
{(zk, yk)}k∈Z+ with limit (z, y) such that zk ∈ A(yk), we
need to show that z ∈ A(y). It is easy to check that zi ∈ Pi
as the set Pi is closed for each i. We thus proceed to show
that the search direction defined by p = z− y always satisfies
linear constraints Ep = 0 and D(y)p ≤ 0. Indeed, the equality
constraint holds by continuity of the linear mapping. Suppose
that the inequality constraint D(y)p ≤ 0 does not hold. Then
there exists a constraint, say the `th constraint, binding at y,
i.e., D>` y = d` such that D
>
` p = δ > 0, where D` is the `th
row of matrix D. By yk → y and D>` y = d`, there exists a
natural number K1 such that for all k ≥ K1,
D>` y
k ≥ d` − δ/4. (42)
Meanwhile, by yk → y and zk → z, there exists a natural
number K2 such that for all k ≥ K2,
D>` (z
k − yk) ≥ δ/2 > 0. (43)
It follows that for all k ≥ max(K1,K2), we have
D>` z
k ≥ D>` yk + δ/2 ≥ d` + δ/4 > d`, (44)
contradicting to the fact zk is feasible as proved in item (a),
as zk ∈ A(yk).
It remains to show that there exists a η ∈ [1,∞) such that
the search step before applying the mapping C (curtailment),
p˜ = η(z − y) is -worthy. Suppose otherwise, then for all
η ∈ [1,∞),
U(y + η(z − y))− U(y) ≤ 1 < . (45)
As U is continuous, yk → y and zk → z, there exists a K3
such that for all k ≥ K3,
U(yk + η(zk − yk))− U(yk) ≤ 2, 2 ∈ (1, ), (46)
contradicting to zk ∈ A(yk). Therefore z ∈ A(y) and so A
is closed.
Proof of Theorem 1: We first recognize that (11) is
a special case of (37), with n = S, m = |I|, Ep = 0
modeling the power balance constraints, Dp ≤ d modeling the
line capacity constraints. We further notice that the -trading
process (see footnote 5) is algorithm (38) with matrices E
and D suitably defined. Invoking Lemma 3 suggests that for
any  > 0, the trading state process {yk}k∈Z+ is such that
U?−limk→∞ U(yk) ≤  and therefore the claim in Theorem 1
follows.
Remark 13 (Trading process for distributed optimization):
Given the general form of optimization (37) and per Lemma 3,
the trading process and its algorithmic correspondence (38)
define a framework for solving distributed optimization prob-
lems. Different from popular algorithms such as coordinate
descent [44] and ADMM [45], which iterate among coor-
dinates with well-defined update order, the trading process
would converge by updating some subsets of the coordinates
(pairs of coordinates in the case of tree network or for network
flow problems as discussed in Appendix D) according to any
order, as long as conditions in the algorithmic mapping (38)
are met. Another distinct feature of the trading process is
that it does not specify a search direction for each update;
it permits any search direction corresponding to a trade with
suitable economic incentives (-worthy trade) thus allows a
great flexibility for designing platforms or systems in which
agents could trade freely for their own benefits with an
essential amount of coordination in place to ensure global
constraints are satisfied.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Writing the Lagrangian of (11) and taking derivative with
respect to pi,s for some RT participant i gives
Pi(s)
∂u˜i,s(p
?)
∂pi,s
+ λn,s − (ηi,s − ηi,s) = 0. (47)
Thus (32) follows from this first order condition. When it
is known that p?i,s ∈ P˚i,s, we have η?i,s = η?i,s = 0 by
complementary slackness, and so equation (31) holds in this
case.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Consider the optimization of participant i at bus n. The
local constraint pi ∈ Pi can be expressed as
p
i
≤ pi ≤ pi,
pi =
1
S
11>pi, if i ∈ IDA, (48)
where the second constraint is the vector form of pi,s =
1
S
∑S
s=1 pi,s, a convenient way to express the non-anticipation
constraint. Let the dual variables for these constraints be
denoted η
i
∈ RS , ηi,s ∈ RS and ζi ∈ RS , respectively. Then
the optimality condition for (33) is
λn,spi,s +Pi(s)
∂u˜i,s(pi,s)
∂pi,s
− (ηi,s − ηi,s)
− (1s − 1
S
1)>ζi1i∈IDA = 0, (49a)
p
i
≤ pi ≤ pi, (49b)
pi =
1
S
11>pi, if i ∈ IDA, (49c)
η
i
, ηi ≥ 0, (49d)
where 1i∈IDA = 1 if i ∈ IDA and 0 otherwise.
Now consider the optimization for SO. Denote the dual
variable for power balance constraint by γs ∈ R and the dual
variable for flow constraint by βs ∈ RL, s ∈ [S]. Then the
optimality condition is
λn,s + γs + (H
>βs)n = 0, n ∈ [N ], s ∈ [S], (50a)
1>xs = 0, s ∈ [S], (50b)
Hxs ≤ f, s ∈ [S], (50c)
βs ≥ 0, s ∈ [S]. (50d)
Collecting optimality conditions (49) for all i ∈ I and that
for SO (50), together with (36), we recover the optimality
condition for (11), where λn,s is the dual for constraint. The
claim in Lemma 2 thus follows.
APPENDIX D
BILATERAL TRADING IN TREE NETWORK
In an example, [21] demonstrates that multilateral trades
involving more than two participants could be necessary
when the network has cycles. The goal of this section is to
complement that result by showing that when the network has
no cycle, bilateral trades are sufficient for the trading process
to converge to the solution of centralized dispatch.
For simplicity, we consider the deterministic case so that
S = 1 and I = IRT. Without loss of generality, we
further compress the notation by assuming there is only one
participant connected to each node, so that In is a singleton
for each n and we use network index n and participant index i
whichever is more convenient. These assumptions reduce our
model to that of [21]. The network is radial so there is no
cycle. With the DC approximation, the power flow model is
equivalent to the standard network flow model [46] as shown
in e.g. [47].
We establish two decomposition results. We will state these
results assuming that the accumulated trade of the network is
zero (x = 0) and we will work with the general line capacity
constraints instead of constraints specified by the loading
vector requirements. In a tree network, incorporating a nonzero
accumulated trade x amounts to modifying the line capacities
and the utility functions; the loading vector requirements are
special cases of the general line capacity constraints as they
simply require the induced line flows on congested lines have
nonpositive contribution to the congested direction. Thus our
treatment leads to no loss of generality.
We first consider decomposing feasible multilateral trades
into feasible bilateral trades.
Proposition 1: Suppose that the line capacities are rational
numbers, i.e., f¯ ∈ QL. For any given feasible multilateral
trade p ∈ QN involving more than two participants, i.e., p ∈
P and ‖p‖0 := |{n ∈ [N ] : pn 6= 0}| ≥ 3, there exists
a finite number K ∈ Z+ of bilateral trades pk ∈ QN with
‖pk‖0 = 2, k = 1, . . . ,K, that are sequentially feasible such
that
∑K′
k=1 p
k ∈ P for any K ′ ≤ K and satisfies ∑Kk=1 pk =
p.
Furthermore, under the same assumptions, there exists a
finite number K˜ ∈ Z+ of bilateral trades p˜k ∈ QN with
‖p˜k‖0 = 2, k = 1, . . . , K˜, that are sequentially feasible
for any ordering satisfying
∑K˜
k=1 p
k = p. That is, let σ :
[K˜] 7→ [K˜] be any permutation of the indices 1, . . . , K˜, then∑K˜′
k=1 p˜
σ(k) ∈ P , K˜ ′ < K˜, and in particular p˜k ∈ P for any
k ∈ [K˜].
Proof: Let (V, E) be the graph underlying the radial
power network, with the node set V = [N ] and the edge set
containing the N − 1 lines of the network. Define the edge
capacity to the capacity of the corresponding line. A flow on
the graph is a (N−1)-vector f that assigns a flow on each edge
of the network satisfying flow conservation (for each node, in-
flow equals the out-flow) and edge capacity constraints. Given
a multilateral trade p, we denote the set of supply nodes by
V+ = {n ∈ V : pn > 0} and the set of demand nodes by
V− = {n ∈ V : pn < 0}. We then extend the graph by
adding a source node vs connecting to all the supply nodes
and adding a sink node vt connecting to all the demand node,
so that the extended graph is (V˜, E˜) with V˜ = V ∪ {vs, vt}
and E˜ = E ∪ {(vs, v) : v ∈ V+} ∪ {(v, vt) : v ∈ V−}.
For edges (vs, v), v ∈ V+, we assign edge capacity to be
pv > 0. Similarly for edges (v, vt), v ∈ V−, the edge capacity
is −pv > 0.
Now we make the observation that the multilateral trade p
and its induced power flow on the radial network is equivalent
to the max flow from vs to vt on the flow network (V˜, E˜).
In particular, the max flow solution would assign flows on
the additional edges in E˜\E equal to the capacities. Together
with the power flow induced by p, we obtain a feasible flow
that maximizes the flow value from vs to vt. Therefore, the
problem of identifying feasible bilateral trades representing
the multilateral trades is equivalent to finding feasible simple
flows representing the max flow on the flow network, where a
simple flow from vs to vt is a flow on a simple path from vs
to vt, which must contain exactly one supply node and one
demand node.
The Ford-Fulkerson algorithm solves the max flow problem
by iteratively identifying a feasible simple flow on the residual
graph. By the definition of the residual graph, this sequence of
simple flows is sequentially feasible. Furthermore, it is known
that Ford-Fulkerson terminates in a finite number of steps for
rational inputs. We thus conclude that the finite collection of
simple flows found by Ford-Fulkerson represents the finite
collection of bilateral trades satisfying the requirements of the
first part of the proposition.
For the second part of the proposition, by Conformal
Realization Theorem [48, Proposition 1.1] we know that there
is a decomposition of the flow induced by p on network (V, E)
into simple flows that are conformal in the sense that the
flow direction of the simple flows on each edge in E is the
same as that of the flow induced by p. It follows that this
finite collection of simple flows is sequentially feasible for any
ordering as for each edge if we choose the positive direction to
be that of the flow direction induced by p, then for any e ∈ E ,
f˜ke ≥ 0 and
∑K˜
k=1 f˜e = fe, where f is the flow induced by
p and f˜k is the flow induced by p˜k. The fact that each of the
simple flows (and the corresponding bilateral trade) is feasible
with respect to the original network constraint follows from
choosing the kth simple flow as the first simple flow in the
sequence.
We proceed to show that any non-redundant profitable
multilateral trades can be decomposed into a collection of
profitable bilateral trades on a tree network.
Definition 7: We say a profitable (and feasible) multilateral
trade p ∈ RN contains redundancy if there exists a curtailment
γ ∈ [0, 1]N such that p˜ ∈ RN defined by p˜n = γnpn, n ∈
[N ], is a feasible trade that achieves at least the same amount
of profit as p. A profitable multilateral trade is deemed non-
redundant if it does not contain redundancy.
Without loss of practicality, we focus on and first state the
result for the linear utility case so that Ui(pi) = αipi for some
αi ∈ R, i ∈ [N ]. The extension to nonlinear case is discussed
after that.
Proposition 2: Under the same assumptions of Proposition 1
and supposing that the utility function U is linear, any non-
redundant profitable multilateral trades can be decomposed
into a finite collection of profitable bilateral trades. Formally,
given a non-redundant profitable trade p ∈ Qn, there exists
a finite number K of bilateral trades pk that are sequen-
tially feasible for any ordering and profitable, and satisfies∑K
k=1 p
k = p.
Proof: Consider the decomposition for the second part of
Proposition 1. If all the bilateral trades in the decomposition
are profitable, there is nothing to prove. Suppose there exists
a bilateral trade in the decomposition that is not profitable,
denoted by p′. We claim that the remaining trade p′′ = p−p′ is
a feasible profitable trade that yields at least the same amount
of profit as p and therefore p has redundancy. Indeed, by the
proof of Proposition 1, p′′ is feasible. Furthermore,
U(p′′)−U(0) =
N∑
i=1
αip
′′
i−0 =
N∑
i=1
αi(pi−p′i) > U(p)−U(0),
(51)
as U(p′) =
∑N
i=1 αi < U(0) = 0 as p
′ is not profitable.
In general, when Ui(pi) is nonlinear but differentiable, we
can decompose any given profitable trade p¯ into M ∈ Z+
copies of trades p¯/M , each of which is profitable by concavity
of U . For pi ∈ [m∆p¯i, (m+1)∆p¯i], m = 0, . . . ,M−1, Taylor
series offers a good linear approximation
Ui(pi) = Ui(m∆p¯i) + U
′(m∆p¯i)pi + o(p¯i/M), (52)
where the last term denotes the approximation error which
is of order higher than p¯i/M and is negligible for practical
purposes when M is sufficiently large. Applying Proposition 2
gives a finite collection of profitable bilateral trades for each
multilateral trade p¯/M with mp¯/M already scheduled into
the system. Pooling these collections of bilateral trades gives
a collection of bilateral trades that approximately represents
the original multilateral trade.
APPENDIX E
TRADE VERIFICATION AND CURTAILMENT WITH LOCAL
SCENARIOS
The bulk of the paper assumes that there is a commonly
known set of global scenarios [S], which may not be practi-
cally available when participants are distributed over a large
geographical area. In this section, we briefly discuss the other
extreme setting where no global scenario is known a priori
and participants are still allowed to submit contingent trades
pks , where s ∈ Sk with Skdenoting the set of local scenarios
that is known to the participants involved in the kth trade.
Motivated by common sources of uncertainty in power systems
(e.g. renewable generation level), we consider the setting that
{pks ∈ R|I| : s ∈ Sk} is an interval10 in R|I|. That is, the
participants submit a lower bound pk and an upper bound
pk to the SO, so that given any realization of the local
uncertainty s ∈ Sk, the resulting contingent trade satisfies
pks ∈ [pk, pk]. Since the SO may not be capable to identify the
exact correlation among these local scenarios, the verification
of power network constraints and curtailment has to be robust
with respect to any combinations of the local scenarios. That
is, the accumulated network power injection defined by
xkn,s =
k−1∑
κ=0
∑
i∈In
γκpκi,s, n ∈ [N ], (53)
must be feasible, i.e.,
xks ∈ P, (54)
for every global scenario s = (s0, . . . , sk−1) generated by
local scenarios sκ ∈ Sκ, κ = 0, . . . , k − 1.
We show that checking and curtailing a new trade pks ∈
[pk, pk] with its corresponding network injection qks ∈ [qk, qk]
can be done in an efficient way so that this process can be
carried out inductively. Under our assumption that the set of
contingent trades is an interval, the verification of xks+q
k
s ∈ P ,
for all s = (s0, . . . , sk), sκ ∈ Sκ, is equivalent to checking
H(xks + q
k
s ) ≤ f¯ , (55)
where xks is defined as in (53) with p
κ
s ∈ [pκ, pκ], κ =
0, . . . , k−1, and qks ∈ [qk, qk]. Given the intervals for previous
trades pκs ∈ [pκ, pκ], κ = 0, . . . , k − 1, and their curtailment
factors, we can form the corresponding interval xks ∈ [xk, xk].
10When this does not hold, we can form the interval by finding the point-
wise extremum of vector pks .
Then verifying the condition above can be done by solving
the following robust linear program:
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ (56a)
s.t. xkn,s =
k−1∑
κ=0
∑
i∈In
γκpκi,s, n ∈ [N ], (56b)
H(xks + γq
k
s ) ≤ f¯ , (56c)
where the last constraint must hold for all xks ∈ [xk, xk] and
qks ∈ [qk, qk]. In particular, if the optimal value of this program
is γ? = 1, then the new trade is feasible; if the optimal value is
less than 1, the new trade needs to be curtailed with curtailment
factor γk = γ? < 1. Finally, we note that this optimization can
be solved efficiently by a bisection process (as the optimization
variable is a scaler) equipped with a constraint checking sub-
routine, which verifies the strong solvability of a set of interval
linear inequalities in polynomial time (cf. [49, Section 2.13]).
